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Abstract
We find that cognitive abilities, educational attainment, and some personality traits in-
directly affect ideological preferences through changes in income. The effects of changes in
personality traits on ideology directly and indirectly through income are in the same direc-
tion. However, the indirect effects of cognitive abilities and education often offset the direct
effects of these variables on ideological preferences. That is, increases in cognitive abilities
and education significantly increase income, which reduces the tendency of individuals to
express leftist preferences. These indirect effects are in some cases sizeable relative to direct
effects. The indirect effects of cognitive abilities through income overwhelm the direct ef-
fects such that increasing IQ increases rightwing preferences. For ideological preferences over
economic policy the indirect effects of advanced education also overwhelm the direct effects,
such that individuals with higher education are more likely to express rightwing preferences
than those with lower education.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between income and ideology has been the subject of much investigation.
Assuming that leftist positions imply greater redistribution of income to the poor, pure self-
interest predicts that as an individual’s income share increases, that individual is more likely to
have rightwing preferences.1 Indeed, a number of studies of the effect of income on ideological
attitudes demonstrates such a relationship. For example, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006)
find that as individuals’ relative incomes increase, they are more likely to support Republican
candidates in the U.S.2 Similarly, Van der Waal, Achterberg, and Houtman (2007) study 15
different countries [Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States]
for the period 1956 to 1990, finding that indeed income is a significant predictor of ideological
preferences.3
Although income may have a direct effect on ideological preferences, it may also serve as
a mechanism through which other variables, such as personality traits, cognitive abilities, and
educational attainment affect ideology. Recent research has drawn increasing attention to the in-
fluence of factors such as personality traits and cognitive abilities on ideological preferences and
the importance of including such factors in explaining individuals’ ideological predispositions.4
Usually these traits are included as additional independent explanatory factors in estimating
the determinants of ideological preferences along with income and their influence is compared
1Although much of government redistribution is arguably directed toward middle class voters rather than the
poor, it is generally accepted that left-leaning parties are more likely to redistribute income to the poor than
right-leaning parties.
2See also the work of Bartels (2006), Brooks and Brady (1999), Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, and Park (2007), and
Stonecash (2000).
3See also Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza (2006) for cross-sectional evidence on the relationship between
class-based cleavages and voting.
4For work on the so-called Big Five personality traits which we explain in the next section see Alford and
Hibbing (2007), Barbaranelli et al (2007), Caprara et al (1999, 2006), Carney et al (2008), Gerber et al (2010),
Gosling, et al (2003), Jost et al (2003), McCrae (1996), Mehrabian (1996), Mondak and Halperin (2008), Rentfrow
et al (2009), Riemann et al (1993), Schoen and Schumann (2007), Stenner (2005), and Van Hiel, et al (2000). For
research on the relationship between cognitive abilities and ideology see Dreay, et al (2008a), Jost et al (2003),
Kanazawa (2009, 2010), Kroth et al (2006), McCrae (1996), Saucier (2000), Schoon et al (2010), and Stankov
(2007)].
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to the influence of income treating each as independent factors as in Gerber et al. (2010). Yet,
considerable evidence suggests that income levels are affected by personality traits and cogni-
tive abilities, as well as educational attainment, which is often also included as an independent
explanatory variable in these analyses.5 Thus, income may be a mediating variable in the rela-
tionship between these individualized traits and educational levels and ideological preferences.
Or it may suppress direct effects of these factors on ideological preferences, offsetting them.
Finding that income serves as a mediating variable (or suppressing variable if the effects
through income offset the direct effects) for these individualized traits and educational levels
can lead to more accurate estimates of the effects of these traits and education on ideology.6 If
income is a mediating or suppressing variable through which these individual differences affect
ideology, then estimations which treat income as a separate independent variable misestimate
the effects of these characteristics on ideological preferences by failing to measure their indirect
effects through income. Gerber et al. recognize this problem and report an estimation excluding
income and in other analyses interact income with measures of personality traits. However,
measuring the indirect effect of these factors on ideology through income is interesting in itself
as doing so may help us better understand the determinants of ideology and how changes in
income either amplify or reduce the effects of these variables.
In this paper we consider explicitly whether income is a mediating or suppressing variable
for individual traits and educational levels in determining ideological preferences using a large
national internet survey. Our analysis is the first to consider the mediating and suppressing role
of income in how these individual characteristics affect ideology and thus provides more accurate
estimates of the effects of these factors on ideology by computing both their direct effects and
their indirect effects through income. Our investigation also provides better estimates of the
5See Borghans et al (2008), Boudreau, Bosewell, and Judge (2001), Gelissen and de Graaf (2006), Judge
Higgins, Thoresen, and Barrick (1999), and Seibert and Kraimer (2001) on the relationship between personality
traits and income. See Gottfredson (1997, 2003), Jensen (1980, 1998), Schmidt and Hunter (2004), and Strenze
(2007) on the relationship between cognitive abilities and income. See Tsai (2010) and Verdugo and Verdugo
(1989) on the relationship between educational attainment and income.
6See Shrout and Bolder (2002) for a discussion of the difference between mediation and suppression. We
explain how we distinguish between these different effects in Section III.
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effect of income on ideology independent of personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational
levels. We find that indeed income serves as a mediating variable for some personality traits
and lower educational levels and a suppressing variable for cognitive abilities and advanced
educational attainment. That is, we find that the effects of some personality traits on ideology
indirectly through income result in a small increase in the total effects of these traits on ideology,
but that the effects of cognitive abilities and educational levels on ideology through income
often offset the direct effects. In fact contrary to previous studies, we find that increases
in intelligence, and in some cases advanced educational attainment, lead to more rightwing
ideological preferences through the indirect effects on income which overwhelm the direct effects.
Our study is distinctive for the data we use to examine these relationships:
First, our income data is verified by taxation authorities rather than self-reported responses
to broad income categories. Hence, we do not assign subjects midpoint estimates of income
or some other arbitrary income level. To our knowledge no previous study of the relationship
between income and ideology has used data with such detail and accuracy. We also have verified
data from governmental authorities on residency, educational attainment, church membership,
age, number of children, marital status, and gender of our subjects.
Second, our personality measures are taken from a 60 question battery unlike the shorter
question batteries used in most other studies of the relationship between personality and ideol-
ogy.7 We thus provide a more accurate picture of personality differences.
Third, we have measures of subjects’ cognitive abilities via an IQ test that has been shown
to have a high degree of reliability. Therefore, we are able to have a broader picture of the
relationship between a broad spectrum of individualized traits on ideological preferences by
combining data on extensive personality measure with our IQ measure.
Fourth, our data, drawn from outside of the United States, tests whether the effects of
personality on ideology, found by Gerber et al. for US voters, generalizes to other populations.
7Gerber et al (2010), for example, use only 10 questions.
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Fifth, because our data is drawn from a country in which political issues are more centralized
without significant variations at the regional level in educational systems, issues of concern to
voters, social groupings, and other factors which can also affect ideological preferences, we are
able to focus more exclusively on the effects of personality traits, cognitive abilities, education,
and income on ideology and the mediating effect of income. Yet our results can be viewed
as generalizable given that the nature of the educational system, economic conditions, and
ideological divides are plainly characteristic of other western developed countries.
In the next section of the paper we summarize existing evidence on the roles played directly
by personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational attainment on ideology. We then
discuss, in Section III, the evidence which suggests that income plays a mediating role for these
variables – leading to indirect effects on ideology. Section IV contains our empirical analysis
and in Section IV we present our conclusions and highlight the implications of our results for
the understanding of the relationship between personality traits, cognitive abilities, income, and
ideology and future research.
2 Personality Traits, Cognitive Abilities, and Educational Ex-
periences as Sources of Ideological Preferences
True Ideological Preferences and Observed Measures
Political scientist Count Antoine Destutt de Tracy invented the term “ideology” in his publica-
tion of Element d’Ideologie in 1817 [see Hart (2002), Head (1985), and Knight (2006)] and its
meaning has varied significantly across researchers in the almost 200 years since its birth. That
said, Knight (2006), in her recent study of the use of the term, finds that political scientists
have converged on several elements of a core definition of ideology. Knight argues that ideol-
ogy has three essential components–coherence, stability, and contrast. Specifically, she finds
that political scientists think of ideology as (page 619) “the way a system–a single individual
or even a whole society–rationalizes itself. Ideologies may be idiosyncratic ..., impractical, or
even delusional, but they still share the characteristics of coherence and temporal stability. The
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characteristic of contrast, or differentiation between alternative principles and their implications
for government, is frequently implicit in analytic treatments of the term. At minimum, contrast
requires two alternatives and some means to distinguish between them.” Moreover, Knight finds
that formal theorists and empirical researchers (page 625, italics in original) “have converged
on a spatial conceptualization of ideology as a left-right ... continuum.”
We distinguish between an individual’s true underlying and unmeasurable ideological pref-
erences and the observed or revealed empirical measures of ideological preferences given by the
individual in response to particular questions such as which party an individual supports in a
given political system, how an individual places him or herself on a specific 1-7 point scale, his
or her views about the role of government in the economy, etc. We think of the true ideolog-
ical preferences as a stable and coherent system that is determined by an individuals’ innate
characteristics and socialization experiences, as Knight describes. We expect that psychologi-
cal traits, cognitive abilities, and educational experiences generally shape these true preferences
primarily during an individual’s early, formative years. We discuss the theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence justifying our expectation on the influence of these factors on ideological
preferences below.
When an individual chooses how to respond to a specific question asking about his or her
ideological preferences, yielding an observed or revealed measure of ideology, we expect that the
individual takes into consideration both his or her true ideological preferences and his or her
current income as well as other factors. So, for example, if asked which political party an in-
dividual supports in an election, the individual considers his or her true ideological preferences,
the positions of the parties in relation to those preferences, and possibly the effects of those
positions on his or her material well being. Some individuals may not care at all about the
effects of the policies on their personal incomes, while others may care a great deal. In this
fashion, we expect observed ideological measures to be functions of personality traits, cognitive
abilities, educational experiences, and income. Since income is also a consequence of person-
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ality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational experiences as well, these characteristics have
both direct effects on observed ideological measures by affecting the individual’s unobservable
true ideological preferences and indirect effects by affecting the individual’s income. Figure 1
below illustrates our model of how these characteristics and income affect observed measures of
ideology.
Figure 1: Hypothesized Relationship Between Individual Characteristics, Income,
True Ideological Preferences, and Observed Ideological Measures
Below we present our specific predictions about the relationships between ideology and the
individual characteristics of personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational attainment
based on previous theoretical and empirical research. These predictions concern the direct
effects of such characteristics on observed ideological measures. We then discuss how income
may also be affected by these same individual characteristics. If individual characteristics
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increase (decrease) incomes, we hypothesize that the indirect effects of these characteristics will
be to make individuals more (less) rightwing in their responses to ideological questions.
Personality and Ideology
As Borghans et al. (2008) document, considerable evidence suggests that personalities can be
represented by five basic dispositional traits. These are typically called the Big Five: Agree-
ableness, Openness, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion. Agreeableness
represents an individuals’ interpersonal orientation and can range from being good-natured,
trusting, and gullible to cynical, rude, suspicious, and manipulative. Openness refers to Open-
ness to experience and curiosity about the desire for new experiences and ideas. Emotional
Stability indicates the degree to which an individual is low in anxiety and has a high toler-
ance for stress. Conscientiousness is the extent that an individual is organized, persistent, and
goal motivated. Extraversion measures an individual’s sociability, warmth, assertiveness, and
activity.
Most researchers in political science who study the effects of personality traits on political
behavior contend that empirical evidence suggests that these traits have a genetic component
and are relatively stable throughout adulthood. Gerber et al. (2010), provide an extensive
review of the psychology literature on personality traits and remark (p. 104) that these traits
are “theorized to be causally prior to traits that are influenced by both core personality traits
and contextual factors” such as “values, attitudes (including political attitudes such as ideology),
expectations about one’s role in society, and personality goals.” Borghans et al. (2008) also
review the literature on personality traits and their use to predict individual economic preferences
and choices. Although Borghans et al. find strong evidence of genetic influence in such traits
and stabilization of traits in adulthood, they also find evidence that some personality traits,
such as Conscientiousness, increase monotonically from childhood to late adulthood (page 976).
Since Adorno et al.’s (1950) work on the “authoritarian personality,” researchers have argued
that there is a link between personality traits and ideological preferences. Most of this research
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has focused on outlooks, temperaments, and sensibilities that are associated with right-leaning
preferences.8 Recently researchers have begun to investigate the relationship between the Big
Five core personality traits and ideological preferences.
Two of the Big Five appear to have robust effects on ideology: Conscientiousness and
Openness, in opposite directions. Researchers have found that individuals who are more Con-
scientious are more likely to express an overall rightist ideology, vote for rightwing parties, and
express rightist views on economic policies.9 As Gerber et al. (2010) point out, these results are
consistent with the view that those who are Conscientious are more likely to adhere to traditional
norms and rules, and thus should not surprisingly support them. In contrast, individuals who
are high on Openness have been shown to be significantly more likely to be left-leaning, vote for
leftist parties, and support leftist economic policies.10 The reasoning given for this relationship
is that individuals who are high on Openness are more likely to be accepting of new ideas and
proposals that overturn traditional and existing ones.
The other three personality traits have shown less consistent relationships with ideologi-
cal preferences. Emotional stability has been sometimes shown to be positively related with
rightwing preferences and voting for rightist parties.11 Here, the rationale is that individuals
who are more neurotic and worried will prefer more interventionist policies, particularly eco-
nomic ones. Most research finds little relationship between Agreeableness or Extraversion and
ideological preferences. The exceptions are Carney et al. (2008) who found in some samples
that both were associated with rightist preferences and Gerber et al. (2010) who also find that
Extraverts are more right-leaning. Furthermore, Gerber et al. find that although Agreeableness
8See for example Altemeyer (1981, 1996), Block and Block (2005), Jost et al (2003), Jost (2006), Lakoff (2006),
McClosky (1958), and Pratto et al (1994).
9See Barbaranelli et al (2007), Caprara et al (1999, 2006), Carney et al (2008), Gerber et al (2010), Gosling,
et al (2003), Mondak and Halperin (2008), and Stenner (2005). In contrast, Alford and Hibbing (2007) and
Mehrabian (1996) do not find a significant relationship.
10See Barbaranelli et al (2007), Capara et al (1999, 2006), Carney et al (2008), Gerber et al (2010), Gosling,
et al (2003), Jost et al (2003), McCrae (1996), Meharbian (1996), Mondak and Halperion (2008), Rentfrow et al
(2009), Riemann et al (1993), Schoen and Schumann (2007), Stenner (2005), and Van Hiel, et al (2000).
11See Barbaranelli et al (2007), Carney et al (2008), Gerber et al (2010), Gosling et al (2003), and Mondak and
Halperin (2008).
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has no significant effect on overall ideology, it is likely to make one more leftist on economic at-
titudes, but rightist on social attitudes. Thus, they contend that the previous inconsistent and
insignificant findings may be because of these countervailing effects on overall ideology.12 Hirsh
et al. (2010) also consider that there might be countervailing effects in Agreeableness. They
divide Agreeableness into two aspects, Compassion and Politeness and find that the Compassion
aspect of Agreeableness is associated with leftist preferences, but that the Politeness aspect is
associated with rightist preferences.
In summary, previous research suggests that lower values of Openness and higher values of
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Extraversion are positively related to overall right-
ist preferences, right-leaning positions on economic policy, and support for rightwing parties,
while Agreeableness may be positively related to leftist positions on economic policy and rightist
positions on social policy.
Intelligence and Ideology
Cognitive abilities are generally defined as characteristics such as the ability to comprehend
complex ideas, adapt successfully to an environment, learn from experience, engage in reason-
ing, and use one’s intellect to overcome obstacles. In contrast to personality traits which vary
in composition across individuals such that one may be high in Agreeableness and but not very
Conscientious, cognitive abilities have been shown to be highly intercorrelated and can be largely
represented along a single dimension, which is typically called intelligence or “IQ.”13 Like per-
sonality traits, cognitive abilities can also change over an individual’s life cycle, however, by
middle childhood the ordinal ranking of these abilities across individuals is highly stable [see
12Gerber et al also show that the relationships between the Big Five traits and ideological preferences are signif-
icantly different between white and black Americans, suggesting that the relationships are affected by contextual
differences in how white and black Americans differ in their views of the meaning of liberal and conservatism.
That is, for example, for black Americans, liberal economic policies may be viewed as a social obligation rather
than helping someone who lacked initative. They find that for black Americans, only Openness has the same
significant effect on ideological preferences. Given the homogeneity of the population of Denmark from which our
survey is drawn, we can safely assume that these differences in contextual views of liberalism are not significant
for our sample.
13See Borghans et al (2008).
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Schuerger and Witt (1989) and Hopkins and Bracht (1975)]. Although both the environment
and genetics determine IQ levels, studies of adopted children find that the effects of the envi-
ronment are primarily early in childhood [see Duyme, Dumaret, and Tomkiewicz (1999) and
Beckett et al. (2006)] with less substantial effects as children age.
Higher cognitive abilities have been shown to be positively correlated with leftist ideological
positions and negatively correlated with rightist positions [Deary et al. (2008a), Jost et al.
(2003), Kanazawa (2009, 2010), Kroth et al. (2006), McCrae (1996), Saucier (2000), Schoon et
al. (2010), and Stankov (2007)]. Dreary et al. (2008b) find that higher cognitive abilities are
also associated with alternatives to the two major political parties in the United Kingdom (the
Liberal and Green Parties).
Wilson (1973), Jost et al. (2003), and Stankov (2007) explain the relationship between
lower cognitive abilities and greater rightist preferences as a motivated response to uncertainty
or threat which is greater for individuals with lower cognitive abilities. Stankov (page 295)
suggests that “the perceived threat may vary depending on cognitive level – sources of threat
such as complexity, novelty, and ambiguity may be more threatening to those who score low as
opposed to those who score high on cognitive tests.”
Kanazawa (2009, 2010) proffers an evolutionary theory to explain the relationship between
intelligence and ideology. He argues that in the human ancestral environment, most problems
were recurrent adaptive ones and that the human brain consists of a large number of domain-
specific evolved psychological mechanisms to solve these recurrent problems. In his view, general
intelligence evolved as a domain-specific adaptation of individuals when they were confronted
with novel, non-recurrent problems. The implication is that more intelligent individuals are
better at solving problems that are evolutionary novel but not better in solving problems that
are evolutionary familiar such as mating, parenting, interpersonal relationships, and wayfinding.
Kanazawa contends (2009, page 541) that his theory further implies that “more intelligent in-
dividuals will be more likely to acquire and espouse evolutionarily novel preferences and values
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than less intelligent individuals, while general intelligence will make no difference for the acqui-
sition and espousal of evolutionary familiar values.” Thus, he contends that his theory explains
why the novel value of leftist preferences is more likely to be associated with higher intelligent
individuals.
In summary, previous research suggests that cognitive abilities can be summarized by a single
factor, called Intelligence, or IQ, and that higher levels of IQ are associated with support for
more leftwing ideological positions and leftwing political parties.
Education and Ideology
Most studies of ideology, such as Gerber et al. (2010), find that individuals who are more
educated are more likely to express leftist preferences, going back to the work of Kaiser and
Lilly (1975) and McClintock and Turner (1967). There are various theoretical justifications
given for this relationship; it may be that education undermines belief in a “natural social
order” [Gabennesch (1972)] or that education instills democratic values in leftist-democratic
societies [Weil (1985)]. However, evidence suggests that it is not just length of education, but
the type of education, i.e. academic or vocational. For example, Nilsson et al. (1985) found
that academic high school students were less rightist than vocational students.
In summary, evidence suggests that individuals with higher levels of academic education are
more likely to express leftist preferences and support leftwing parties. In particular, we expect
that individuals with vocational education or only basic education levels will be most rightwing and
that as educational attainment increases beyond vocational training, leftist ideological preferences
will increase as well.
3 On Income as a Mediating or Suppressing Variable
Personality Traits and Income
We now turn to how income may be affected by personality traits, cognitive abilities, and edu-
cation. We first address the relationship between personality traits and income. As Borghans
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et al. (2008) discuss, considerable evidence shows that personality traits can affect career suc-
cess and as a consequence, income. Boudreau, Boswell, and Judge (2001), Gelissen and de
Graaf (2006), Judge et al. (1999), and Seibert and Kraimer (2001) study the relationship be-
tween the Big Five and extrinsic career success. All of these studies demonstrate that high
levels of Extraversion and high levels of Emotional Stability are positively related to success.
The rationale for the effect of Extraversion on success is that Extraverts are more likely to be
active, dominant, and ambitious and that these traits are valued and rewarded. Extraverts
are furthermore argued to be more likely to enhance their careers, seek new challenges, and
deal with unpleasant working conditions. The rationale for the effect of Emotional Stability
on career success is that individuals who are less anxious and stressful are better able to deal
with higher-level jobs that are complex and tense. Since both of these variables also have been
shown to lead to more rightist ideological preferences, as reviewed above, these results suggest
that the observation that higher income levels lead to more rightist ideological positions may
simply reflect the personality trait differences.
Similarly, Gelissen and de Graaf as well as Seibert and Kraimer find that Openness has a
negative effect on income. It is reasoned that individuals who are open to experience may
be more likely to change occupations or be unhappy in traditional jobs. As we noted above,
Openness is likely to lead to more leftist ideological preferences. Thus, as with Extraversion
and Emotional Stability, the tendency of low income individuals expressing leftist ideological
positions may simply reflect greater Openness rather than lower income levels.
Furthermore, Boudreau et al. and Judge et al. find that Agreeableness is also negatively
related to career success. This may occur because more agreeable individuals are more likely to
sacrifice their success to please others or the trait of Agreeableness is not highly valued where
individuals are expected to be critical and judgemental as in some high level positions. As noted
above, there is some evidence that Agreeableness leads to more leftist economic policy positions.
Hence if Agreeableness also leads to lower incomes, the negative relationship between income and
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leftist positions on economic policies may simply reflect higher levels of Agreeableness among
low income individuals.
Theoretically we might expect that Conscientious individuals would be more likely to achieve
success through hard work and persistence and thus earn higher incomes. Since Conscientious
individuals are more likely to have rightist ideological positions, then it seems that high levels of
Conscientiousness of high income voters might explain the income and ideological relationship
as well. However, there is little evidence that Conscientiousness has a positive effect on income.
Only Gelissen and de Graaf find a relationship between Conscientiousness and income. Fur-
thermore, they find that women who are more Conscientious have less career success, although
the effect is small. Thus, in contrast to the other four traits, Conscientiousness is not expected
to explain the income and ideology relationship.
It is possible that job characteristics which affect one’s environment may also have an effect
on personality. However, Robins et al. (2001), Judge et al. (1999), and Costa and McCrae
(1988) provide evidence that it is likely that the causal direction is primarily from personality
to career outcomes. In particular, it appears that the growth in stability in personalities that
occurs over time is due to a growing influence of genetics. The belief that genetics becomes
more important is based on what is known as the “gene-environment correlation;” that is, as
an individual ages, he or she is able to exert more control over his or her environment and
individuals with similar genetic predispositions share similar environments [see Rutter (2006)].
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that personality traits have a greater effect on income than
vice-versa, even though personality traits may change over time, particularly as one grows older.
In our empirical analysis we control for the effects of age differences.
In summary, we expect that higher levels of Extraversion and Emotional Stability and lower
levels of Openness will lead to both higher incomes and more rightist ideological preferences.
Higher levels of Agreeableness will lead to more leftist economic policy positions and lower income
levels. Hence, the direction of changes in these personality traits have the same predictable effects
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on ideological preferences as their effects on income would imply. That is, those traits that lead
one to be more rightwing, also lead one to earn higher income and some of what may appear to
be an effect of income on ideological preferences may be caused by personality trait differences.
However, we expect that Conscientiousness will have no mediating effect on ideology through
income.
Intelligence and Income
Considerable scientific research has demonstrated that individuals with higher IQ scores earn
higher income than those with lower scores [see Gottfredson (1997, 2003), Jensen (1980, 1998),
and Schmidt and Hunter (2004)]. Nevertheless, there is some disagreement over the size of the
correlation between the two with Jensen (1998, page 568) finding it is around 0.40 and Bowles et
al. (2001) discovering only a 0.15 correlation. In a recent meta-analysis which corrects for some
of the problems of independence and omitted variables in the previous work, Strenze (2007)
found a correlation of 0.23. Although low, Strenze argues that the correlation should be viewed
in context (page 415): “... other predictors ... are not doing better in predicting income, which
demonstrates that financial success is difficult to predict by any variable. ... It should be noted
that the correlation of .23 is about the size of the average meta-analytic result in psychology
... and cannot, therefore, be treated as insignificant.” Strenze also finds evidence that suggests
that the effect of intelligence on income is independent of parental socio-economic status.
Since higher intelligence levels lead to higher incomes as well as more leftist ideological pref-
erences, we expect that the increases in income as a consequence of higher intelligence levels may
reduce the effects of intelligence on ideological preferences.
Education and Income
The relationship between educational attainment and income is similarly considered established
fact. Education is posited to increase individuals’ abilities and skills, thereby leading them
to better and higher paying jobs. Verdugo and Verdugo (1989, page 4) remark that “[a]
15
dominant paradigm in both sociology and economics suggests a positive relationship between
education and earnings. Scholars from both fields suggest that educated workers earn more than
their less educated counterparts because they are more productive.” Yet, the relationship, as
Verdugo and Verdugo point out, is sometimes not as simple as the paradigm would suggest. In
particular, they show that overeducated workers often earn less than their adequately educated
or undereducated counterparts. However, in a recent study Tsai (2010) shows that workers
who are overeducated tend to also have lower ability or other unobserved characteristics that
lead to overeducation. He argues that workers with low abilities are more likely to obtain
an overeducated job since they are less able to perform the job for which they have received
education. Once the heterogeneity in individual abilities is taken into account, Tsai finds that
the wage differences between overeducated and adequately educated is negligible. As we have
measures of individual cognitive abilities as well as educational attainment, we are able to control
for such heterogeneity in our analysis.14
Since higher educational levels lead to higher income levels, as with cognitive abilities, we
expect that the indirect effect of education on ideology through income to reduce the direct effect of
education on ideological preferences. That is, we expect that as educational attainment increases,
income levels will increase, leading to more rightwing ideological preferences.
4 Data and Empirical Models
Data
The data for our study comes from a paid survey conducted through iLEE (internet Laboratory
for Experimental Economics) at the Center for Experimental Economics at the University of
Copenhagen in spring 2008.15 A random sample of 22,207 subjects were drawn based on
socio-economic characteristics from the general voting-age population of Denmark, with the
14One might argue that educational attainment is a function of IQ as well. As we do not explicitly explore that
possible relationship in our analysis, our results are best viewed as measuring the effect of educational attainment
holding cognitive abilities constant and vice-versa.
15The internet platform is supported by the Carlsberg Foundation.
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collaboration of Statistics Denmark (SD) a Danish governmental agency. SD sent hard-copy
letters by regular mail, inviting participants to log into iLEE’s webpage using a random ID
number and to complete the survey within a week. Upon login subjects were informed that the
study would take approximately 50 minutes and that they would only be paid if they completed
the entire study. The survey was conducted in Danish. After completion of the survey,
the choice data was sent to SD where it was matched by SD with the detailed socio-economic
data (income, education, etc.). The data was then made available to the researchers in a
fully anonymous format. Of the subjects, contacted, 3,584 logged into the survey, and 1,823
completed all the questions.
Our principal dependent variables are four questions on ideological preferences of the sub-
jects, which together we label our Ideology Measures. All of the questions provided subjects
with the option “Prefer not to answer.” The first question related to voting behavior: “What
party would you vote for if there was an election tomorrow?” The subject could choose one of
the nine parties who were eligible for parliament in the 2007 elections, along with the options
“Would not vote” and “Would vote blank.” The nine parties were ranked on a scale from right to
left, with 1 equally the most extreme rightist party (Danish People’s Party) and 9 representing
the most extreme leftist party (Unity List – Red – Green Alliance).16 This variable is labeled
Party. 1,893 subjects completed the Party question.
The remaining three questions were taken from the World Values Survey (1999). The
second question was a classic ideology question in which the subject had to place herself on a
left-right scale: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” A scale from 1 to 10 was presented with
1 representing extreme left and 10 representing extreme right. For our empirical analysis the
16The full ordering of the parties is as follows: 1 = Danish People’s Party, 2 = Conservatives, 3 = Liberals, 4 =
New Alliance, 5 = Christian Democrats, 6 = Social Liberals, 7 = Social Democrats, 8 = Socialist Peoples Party,
and 9 = Unity List – Red – Green Alliance. The ranking was validated by Jørgen Goul Andersen, an expert
on Danish political parties. The ranking also corresponds to rankings of the same Danish parties in Benoit and
Laver (2006); Benoit and Laver exclude one new party which we include and include two old parties which we
exclude.
17
scale was reversed such that 10 represented an extreme left position. The re-scaled variable is
labeled Leftist. 2,028 subjects completed this question.
The third and fourth questions related to economic policy of the government. The third ques-
tion concerned government responsibility for individuals’ wellbeing. Subjects were presented
with two opposing views placed on either end of a 1-10 scale and asked to place themselves
on the scale in accordance with their own views. The two statements were: “People should
take more responsibility to provide for themselves” and “The government should take more
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” These statements were placed at 1 and
10 respectively. We used answers to this question to create the variable labeled Econ1 The
fourth question concerned preferences for competition and had the same structure as the third
question which we used to create the variable labeled Econ2. The two opposing statements
were: “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” and
“Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.” Again, the first statement was
placed at 1 and the second statement was placed at 10. 2,107 subjects completed Econ1 and
2,106 subjects completed Econ2.
After completion of the these questions, subjects completed a Big Five personality test and
an IQ test. We used the Big Five personality test NEO PI-R Short Version and the IQ test I-S T
200R which are copyrighted and administered by the Danish Psychological Publishing Company
(Dansk Psykologisk Forlag). The Danish NEO-PI-R Short Version consists of five 12-item scales
measuring each domain. The 12 items for each domain are chosen from the original 48 items (of
the full NEO-PI-R test) as follows: for each facet the two items (out of eight) with the highest
correlation with the total factor score are chosen (this is different from the American 60-item
version of NEO-PI-R, called NEO-FFI, where the 12 items with the highest correlation with
the total factor score is picked, without regard to which facets the single items belong to). In
the Danish short version, all facets are therefore represented equally within each domain. The
Danish short version has been shown to be highly correlated with the long test such that Costa
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and McCrae (2004) conclude that if one only wants to examine the Big Five factors, one could
just as well use the short test instead of the full version.17
In the Big Five test subjects were presented with 60 statements and asked to state whether
they agree or disagree with each on a 0-4 scale which contained the options “Strongly disagree,”
“Disagree,” “Neutral,” “Agree,” and “Strongly agree.” Using these answers we constructed the
variables that measured the five personality traits, BigFiveA for Agreeableness, BigFiveC for
Conscientiousness, BigFiveE for Extraversion, BigFiveO for Openness, and BigFiveN for Emo-
tional Stability. In our analysis the first four of these variables, BigFiveA, BigFiveC, BigFiveE,
BigFiveO are measured with higher values representing higher levels of the respective trait, but
BigFiveN is measured with higher values representing lower levels of Emotional Stability (higher
levels of Neuroticism).
In the IQ test subjects are presented with 20 questions or puzzles and asked to solve as many
as possible within a 10 minute period. The IQ test we used is part of a more extensive test called
“IST 2000 R”. This test contains several modules and we chose to use a part that is a variation
of Raven’s Progressive Matrices. An advantage of The Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test is that
it does not depend heavily on verbal skills or other kinds of knowledge taught during formal
education. The results from the IQ test were used to create a continuous variable measuring
performance which we labeled IQ.18
After completing the personality and IQ tests, subjects were asked to provide their bank
account numbers and were told that their payment would be transferred to them after the study
was concluded.
The data from the survey was combined with demographic data from administrative registers
of Danish governmental agencies. Our income data is from 2006 and refers to the logged value
of total gross income of the individual (salary, pension, capital income, etc.) in thousand Danish
17The correlations between the short and long tests are as follows: 0.93 for Emotional Stability, 0.90 for
Extraversion, 0.93 for Openness, 0.89 for Agreeableness, and 0.91 for Conscientiousness. These estimates are
based on a sample of 600 observations, see Costa and McCrae (2004).
18We omitted subjects who scored less than 5 on the IQ test.
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Kroner, which is labeled as the continuous variable Income. As noted above, our income data
is unique for studies of the effects of income on ideology. We omitted individuals with negative
values of income due to large capital losses. For robustness, we also considered truncating the
data at the lower and upper percentiles, replacing the continuous variable with dummies and
including a squared income variable. The qualitative results were robust to these variations.19
We also include age, age squared, and age cubed, in order to capture nonlinear relationships
between age and our dependent variables. As with income, we also tested the robustness of our
results by replacing the continuous age variable with dummies.
Education levels are divided into six categories as follows: EduBasic for individuals who
did not complete a high school degree, EduHS for individuals who completed or are in the
process of completing an academic high school degree, but no advanced education; EduVoc for
individuals who completed or are in the process of completing vocational education instead of
attending an academic high school, and three variables for various levels for advanced university
training: EduAdv1 for individuals who have completed or in the process of completing some
academic post-secondary education less than a Bachelor’s degree, EducAdv2 for individuals who
have completed a Bachelor’s degree, and EducAdv3 for individuals who have completed or in
the process of completing a Masters or Ph.D. degree. EduVoc was omitted in the empirical
analysis and served as our baseline case since previous research has suggested that individuals
with vocational education have the most rightwing ideological preferences. Student designated
individuals who are currently studying and spanned all the education categories, depending on
the extent that they had completed their education.
Other demographic variables included in the analysis whose names are self-explanatory in-
clude: Female, Urban, Parttime, Retired, Unemployed, Married, and Divorced. We also in-
clude Couple for unmarried couples and Church for individuals who are members of the Danish
19Some might contend that it is wealth that affects ideology and that income is affected by wealth. Our income
variable includes capital income so arguably measures wealth as well. We also have an independent measure of
wealth that includes the value of many assests such as stockes and bonds, housting, and cash holdings at bank
accounts. Including the weath varaible in our analysis does not change our qualitative results.
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Lutheran Church. The Appendix summarizes the data used in the analysis and compares the
sample to the Danish population 18 years old and older. In general the match is good, with a
somewhat over-representation of middle-aged individuals who necessarily have more education
and earn higher incomes.
Empirical Models
As argued above, our principal goal is to determine the extent that income serves as a mediating
or suppressing variable for personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational attainment in
determining observed ideological preferences. In order to estimate the mediation or suppression
effects, we used the following procedure. We first estimated four sets of seemingly unrelated
regressions. In each set we estimated simultaneously two equations. In the first equation
Income serves as the dependent variable. In the second equation one of the four ideological
measures serves as the dependent variable, Party, Leftist, Econ1, or Econ2. For example,
to determine the mediation effect of the Big Five personality traits for the ideological measure
Party we estimated the simultaneously the following two seemingly unrelated regressions (other
covariates included our IQ measure and our education measures):
Income = αI + βIABigF iveA+ βICBigF iveC + βIOBigF iveO (1)
+βIEBigF iveE + βINBigF iveN +OtherCovariates+ µI
Party = αp + βpABigF iveA+ βPCBigF iveC + βpOBigF iveO (2)
+βpEBigF iveE + βpNBigF iveN + βpIIncome+OtherCovariates+ µP
The coefficient βpA is an estimate then of the direct effect on Party of Agreeableness, con-
trolling for Income and βpC , βpO, βpE , and βpN are similarly defined. Correspondingly, the
coefficients on IQ and our education variables measure the direct effect of these on Party. To
21
determine the indirect effect or mediated effect of Agreeableness on Party through Income we
multiply the coefficient on Agreeableness in Equation 1, βIA times the coefficient on Income
in the Equation 2, βpI . If a mediation effect has occurred, we expect the indirect effect to be
nonzero and have the same sign as the direct effect. If a suppression effect has occurred, we
expect the indirect effect to be nonzero and to have the opposite sign from the direct effect.20
As Preacher and Hayes (2004) discuss, statistically evaluating the null hypothesis that the prod-
uct of these terms is nonzero is a more powerful strategy to establish indirect effects than other
procedures that have been suggested as in Baron and Kenny (1986).
Although the estimation of Equations 1 and 2 provides estimates of the standard errors of
βIA and βpI , it does not provide an estimate for the standard error of the product of these
two parameters. Moreover, the product is likely to be nonnormal and skewed when either a
mediation or suppression effect exists. As Shrout and Bolger (2002) discuss, ignoring the skew
reduces the power to detect mediation or suppression effects. We therefore used bootstrap
measures to determine the standard errors and confidence intervals for the indirect effect βIA∗βpI
as developed by Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and described in Appendix A of Shrout and Bolger.
We used similar procedures to determine the direct and indirect effects of the other Big Five
variables as well as IQ and our education measures.21
In our analysis we compute the indirect effects for each of the personality variables, IQ,
and our education measures, treating the other traits as covariates. We therefore assume that
there are no interaction effects among the Big Five variables, IQ, and our education measures in
determining income. Although we use ordinary least squares for this analysis, we also estimated
ordered logit and tobit models of these equations independently with little difference in the
qualitative results.
Our estimation strategy assumes that the correlation between µI and µP is equal to zero. It is
well known that if there are common unobserved factors in both equations then our estimates are
20See MacKinnon et al. (1995, 2000).
21See also Preacher and Hayes (2004).
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inaccurate. For instance, part of the effect of the unobserved factor on Party could be attributed
to Income even though it has a direct effect on Party. An alternative estimation strategy would
be to use an instrumental variable approach as in two-stage least squares. However, to do so
we would need to make exclusion restrictions, arbitrary assumptions that some of our variables
affect Income but not Party. For example, one might argue that our education variables could
serve as instruments for Income, but doing so would mean that we would need to assume that
educational attainment has no direct effect on Party, contrary to the theoretical arguments that
we reviewed previously. Unfortunately, we lack an instrument for Income that is theoretically
unlikely to also affect our ideological measures. We see our analysis as a first cut at exploring the
possible indirect effects of personality traits, cognitive abilities, and education through Income
on ideology. We hope our study will encourage further research using theoretically reasonable
instruments to determine if our results are robust to stronger specifications.
We summarize the relationships we expect to find between personality traits, cognitive abil-
ities, education, income, and ideology in our estimations in Table 1 below. We expect to find
that changes in personality traits that increase income (with the exception of Agreeableness)
also decrease all of our ideological measures both directly and indirectly through their effects
on income (Openness, Extraversion, and Emotional Stability). Changes in Agreeableness are
expected to have an effect both direct and indirect on our economic policy ideological measures
only and changes in Conscientiousness are not expected to have an indirect effect on our ide-
ological measures through income, but a negative direct effect on our ideology measures. In
contrast, when IQ levels increase, the direct effect on our ideology measures is expected to
be positive, but the indirect effect is expected to be negative because of the effect of IQ on
Income. We expect that the direct effect of our various educational attainment measures, as
compared to vocational education, will lead to a direct positive effect on ideology. The indirect
effects through income will be positive for EduBasic but negative for more advanced educational
attainment because of the effects of educational attainment on income.
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Table 1: Expected Relationships
Big Five Education (Voc Omitted)
Income O C E A N IQ Basic HS Adv1 Adv2
Income – ? + – – + – + + +
Party & Leftist. (Direct) – + – – ? + + + + + +
Party & Leftist (Indirect) + ? – ? + – + – – –
Econ1 & 2 (Direct) – + – – + + + + + + +
Econ1 & 2 (Indirect) + ? – + + – + – – –
5 Results
Determinants of Income
We estimated versions of Equations 1 and 2 for each of our four measures of ideology. Note
that the number of observations across estimations varies with the number of subjects who an-
swered each question as discussed above. We also estimated the equations for the common
sample of observations of subjects who answered all questions with the same qualitative results.
We also find little variation across ideological measures. Furthermore, the means and stan-
dard deviations of the variables in the analyses do not vary markedly across samples (see the
Appendix).
First we report the results of the effects of personality traits, intelligence, and education on
income variables in Table 2 in Equation 1. Since we used four different measures of ideology and
estimated separate seemingly unrelated regressions for each measure, we report four different
estimations of Equation 1, depending on the ideology measure considered in the seemingly
unrelated regression estimation, as identified by the column headings in the table. We find little
variation in the coefficients in Equation 1 across ideological measures, although our sample size
varies as not all subjects responded to all of the ideological measures, as discussed above. We
included the demographic controls discussed above in the estimation and the full results are
available from the authors.
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Table 2: Determinants of Income (Equation 1)
Ideological Measure in Equation 2
Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
BigFiveO Coeff. -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Std. Err. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BigFiveC Coeff. 0.004* 0.004** 0.005** 0.005**
Std. Err. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BigFiveE Coeff. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Std. Err. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BigFiveA Coeff. -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
Std. Err. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BigFiveN Coeff. -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
Std. Err. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
IQ Coeff. 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01***
Std. Err. 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
EduBasic Coeff. -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13***
Std. Err. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
EduHS Coeff. -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
Std. Err. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
EduAdv1 Coeff. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Std. Err. 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
EduAdv2 Coeff. 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
Std. Err. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
EduAv3 Coeff. 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.33***
Std. Err. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 1893 2028 2107 2106
R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Note: EduVoc Omitted, Demographic Controls Included. ***Sig. at 1% level,
**Sig. at 5% level, *Sig. at 1% level.
In order to determine whether the estimated relationships are meaningful, we also estimated
the size of the effects of changes in our principal independent variables in Table 3 below. Given
our log specification, these effect sizes report the percentage change in income as a consequence
of a change in one standard deviation of our non-dummy variables and as a consequence of a
one-unit change in our dummy variables (the education attainment measures).
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Table 3: Estimated Percentage Change in Income
Ideological Measure in Equation 2
Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
Std. Dev. Change In:
BigFiveO -1.65% -1.75% -1.63% -1.79%
BigFiveC 2.04% 2.44% 2.64% 2.57%
BigFiveE 1.22% 1.23% 1.35% 1.52%
BigFiveA -2.73% -2.83% -2.71% -2.89%
BigFiveN -4.11% -4.24% -4.37% -4.19%
IQ 2.70% 2.65% 2.73% 2.82%
Change from 0 to 1:
EduBasic -13.67% -12.49% -13.21% -14.01%
EduHS -9.68% -7.29% -7.90% -8.47%
EduAdv1 -1.74% -1.34% 0.18% -0.80%
EduAdv2 15.25% 16.08% 16.19% 16.19%
EduAv3 34.70% 36.74% 35.90% 36.57%
Note: EduVoc Reference Group.
Our results show support for some of the previous work that finds a relationship between
personality traits and income. We find robust evidence that higher levels of Emotional Stability
(lower levels of BigFiveN ) lead to significantly higher levels of income for all the measures of
ideology. A standard deviation change in Emotional Stability has the largest effect on ideology
as compared to our other personality trait measures, leading to a little over a 4% decrease in
income. We also find that significantly higher levels of Agreeableness (higher values of BigFiveA)
lead to significantly lower levels of income (a standard deviation change in Agreeableness leads
to an almost 3% decrease in income). Surprisingly we find no significant effects on income
of higher levels of Openness (higher values of BigFiveO) or of Extraversion (higher values of
BigFiveE), in contrast to previous studies, across all ideological measures. Furthermore, we find
unexpectedly that higher levels of Conscientiousness (higher values of BigFiveC ) significantly
increases income for three of our measures of ideology (the relationship is significant at the 10%
level when we use our Party ideological measure), which is also contrary to previous work, but
consistent with theoretical expectations. A standard deviation change in Conscientiousness
leads to an approximate 2.5% increase in income.
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In keeping with previous empirical work and theoretical expectations we find that higher
values of IQ significantly increase income across ideological measures. A standard deviation
increase in Intelligence leads to an almost 3% increase in income. We moreover find that
differences in academic educational attainment has a significant effect on income, across our
ideological measures, with vocational education (our omitted category, EduVoc) equivalent in
the effect on income of academic educational attainment of one level above high school education
(EduAdv1 ) and as those who have completed high school (EduHS ). Individuals with only a basic
education make significantly less than those with a vocational education, while those with the
most advanced education (EduAdv2 and EduAdv3 ) make significantly more. The effects of
education are also sizeable, individuals with only a basic education make around 13% less than
those with a vocational education and those with advanced education make around 16% more
for EduAdv2 and 35% more for EduAdv3.
Direct Effects on Ideology
We now turn to the results in estimating ideology in the four versions of Equation 2 which is
summarized in Table 4 below. The coefficients in this table report the direct effects on each
ideology measure of each of the variables listed. Recall that our ideological measures are
constructed such that higher values represent more leftist ideological preferences.
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Table 4: Determinants of Ideology (Direct Effects)
Ideological Measure in Equation 2
Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
Income Coeff. -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.24** -0.27***
Std. Err. 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09
BigFiveO Coeff. 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02***
Std. Err. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BigFiveC Coeff. -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.02***
Std. Err. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BigFiveE Coeff. -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02***
Std. Err. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BigFiveA Coeff. 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06***
Std. Err. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BigFiveN Coeff. 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Std. Err. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IQ Coeff. -0.001 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
Std. Err. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
EduBasic Coeff. 0.25 0.14 0.06 -0.02
Std. Err. 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14
EduHS Coeff. 0.31 0.33 0.54** 0.60***
Std. Err. 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.20
EduAdv1 Coeff. -0.12 -0.21 -0.29 0.06
Std. Err. 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.17
EduAdv2 Coeff. 0.99*** 0.72*** 0.33*** 0.36***
Std. Err. 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.11
EduAv3 Coeff. 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.02 0.04
Std. Err. 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14
Observations 1893 2028 2107 2106
R-Squared 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.14
Note: Controls Included, EduVoc omitted. ***Sig. at 1% level, **Sig. at 5%
level, *Sig. at 1% level.
As above, we also report estimated sizes of the effects of a standard deviation change in
personality traits and IQ on our ideological measures in Table 5 below. Since our variable
Income is logged, the effect size is nonlinear for changes in non-logged income. We report the
effect sizes for a one standard deviation change for income at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile,
and 75th percentile. Notice that the effect size dimensions with increases in relative income,
which is reasonable. For our educational measures the size of the effects of a one-unit change
in these dummy variables are straightforwardly seen from the coefficients in the regressions.
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Table 5: Estimated Direct Effect on Leftwing Preferences
Ideological Measure in Equation 2
One Standard Deviation Change In: Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
Non-Logged Income at 25th percentile -0.43 -0.41 -0.19 -0.22
Non-Logged Income at 50th percentile -0.32 -0.31 -0.14 -0.16
Non-Logged Income at 75th percentile -0.26 -0.25 -0.12 -0.13
BigFiveO 0.36 0.35 0.23 0.12
BigFiveC -0.23 -0.28 -0.11 -0.12
BigFiveE -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.15
BigFiveA 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.32
BigFiveN 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.23
IQ -0.002 0.02 -0.08 -0.05
Note: Recall Party measured on a 1-9 scale, others on a 1-10 scale.
Not surprisingly, and in keeping with previous research, we find that income has a signifi-
cant and negative relationship with all four of our ideological measures, although the effect is
twice as high for our overall ideological measures than for our economic policy measures. We
also find, as in previous research, that increases in Openness (higher values of BigFiveO), de-
creases in Conscientiousness (lower values of BigFiveC ) and Emotional Stability (higher values
of BigFiveN ), have the direct effect of leading to higher levels of leftist preferences across our
ideological measures. Furthermore, we find that the size of the effect of a change in personality
traits is comparable to the size of the effect of a change in income, as found by Gerber et al.
(2010), which is notable given the strong validity of our income data.
However, we find some differences from previous research. Notably, we find that Extraver-
sion (BigFiveE ) has no apparent direct effect on our ideology measures with the exception of
Econ2, where we find the expected negative relationship22 and that higher levels of Agreeable-
ness (BigFiveA) have a significantly positive direct effect on all four of our ideology measures,
not just the ones related to economic policy. Recall that Gerber et al. found that higher levels
of Agreeableness had an ambiguous effect on overall ideological preferences, leading to more
rightwing preferences on social policy measures but more leftwing preferences on economic pol-
icy measures. Our contrary finding may arise because of contextual differences in how Danes
22Gerber et al similarly find that Extraversion has no significant effect on their ideology measures.
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think of overall ideology as compared to United States citizens.
In another difference from previous research we find little evidence of a direct effect of
intelligence on ideology; the estimated direct effect is not significantly different from zero for
all four of our ideology measures. Thus, for Danes there seems to be little direct effect of
intelligence on ideological preferences, once we control for the indirect effect through income.
Furthermore, we find that the direct effect of differences in education for those who have less
than advanced academic education of the second level (EduAdv2 ) is not significant for our
general measures of ideology, Party and Leftist – implying that the direct effect of education on
ideological preferences is roughly equivalent for those who have a basic education or just a high
school education to those who have advanced education of the first level or vocational training.
We find that advanced academic training of the second and third levels (EduAdv2 and
EduAdv3 ) does have a significantly positive direct effect on ideological preferences for our overall
measures of ideology (Party and Leftist). These results suggest that university training does
make one more likely to express leftist ideological preferences. We find mixed results with
respect to our two measures of economic policy preferences – individuals with advanced academic
training of level 2 are significantly more likely in the direct effect to be leftist on these measures
as compared to those with vocational training only, but there is no significant difference in the
direct effect between those of advanced academic training of level 3 and those with vocational
training. Furthermore, the size of these direct effects of education are relatively small given
that they are roughly equivalent to a standard deviation change in personality traits.
Indirect Effects on Ideology
The direct effects of personality traits, intelligence, and education on ideological preferences are
interesting, but our main contribution is our investigation of the indirect effects through income,
which are provided in Tables 6a and b below. Table 6a presents the results for ideological
measures Party and Leftist and Table 6b presents the results for Econ1 and Econ2. As noted
in the previous Section, we use bootstrap standard errors (with 5,000 bootstrap-samples for
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each estimation) and corrected for bias in computing the reported 95% confidence intervals of
the indirect effects.23 As Efron and Tibshirani (1993) explain, standard percentile confidence
intervals tend to be too narrow. Thus we use the bias corrected bounds which take into account
the asymmetries in the distributions of the bootstap estimates.
Table 6a: Indirect Effects on General Ideology Measures
Observed Coeff. Bias Bootstrap Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval
Indirect Effects on Party Through Income
BigFiveO -0.001387 -0.000082 0.001077 -0.000387 0.003957
BigFiveC -0.001881 -0.000032 0.001477 -0.005100 0.000770
BigFiveE -0.000993 -0.000084 0.001124 -0.003296 0.001138
BigFiveA 0.002543 0.000187 0.001586 -000385 0.005856
BigFiveN 0.003025** 0.000039 0.001318 0.000806 0.006102
IQ -0.004873** 0.000027 0.002360 -0.010654 -0.001144
EduBasic 0.066467** 0.001884 0.025862 0.024308 0.124577
EduHS 0.039120 0.002452 0.038116 -0.028246 0.119574
EduAdv1 -0.0028533 0.000378 0.023802 -0.047191 0.047853
EduAdv2 -0.0811668** -0.002263 0.024635 -0.135999 -0.040448
EduAdv3 -0.1637223** -0.004804 0.044243 -0.255137 -0.084168
Indirect Effects on Leftist Through Income
BigFiveO 0.001466 -0.000139 0.001005 -0.000195 0.003837
BigFiveC -0.002236 -0.000027 0.001393 -0.005212 0.000309
BigFiveE -0.000995 -0.000045 0.001033 -0.003058 0.000962
BigFiveA 0.002608** 0.000051 0.001425 0.000006 0.005624
BigFiveN 0.003092** -0.000080 0.001167 0.001114 0.005864
IQ -0.004703** -0.000052 0.002082 -0.009430 -0.001222
EduBasic 0.058990** -0.001039 0.022386 0.022448 0.111061
EduHS 0.025763 0.001507 0.034691 -0.041003 0.095554
EduAdv1 -0.0042486 -0.004324 0.0211260 -0.039943 0.046876
EduAdv2 -0.0835051** -0.000335 0.0209906 -0.131273 -0.048663
EduAdv3 -0.1689367** 0.000236 0.0369951 -0.249096 -0.104974
Note: Controls Included, Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals, EduVoc ommitted. **Sig. at 5% level
established through Confidence Interval Estimation
23Given the nonnormal distribution of the test statistic, we do not report other levels of significance.
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Table 6b: Indirect Effects on Economic Ideology Measures
Observed Coeff. Bias Bootstrap Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval
Indirect Effects on Econ1 Through Income
BigFiveO 0.0006332 -0.000047 0.0005419 -0.000086 0.002228
BigFiveC -0.0011344** 0.000010 0.0008354 -0.003530 -0.000022
BigFiveE -0.0005088 -0.000032 0.0005656 -0.002088 0.000267
BigFiveA 0.0011688* 0.000063 0.0008202 -0.000039 0.003115
BigFiveN 0.0014513** 0.000011 0.0008674 0.000167 0.003630
IQ -0.0022535** -0.000025 0.0014163 -0.005917 -0.000255
EduBasic 0.0295759** 0.000670 0.0168111 0.004496 0.071128
EduHS 0.0136921 0.001486 0.0190377 -0.013462 0.065023
EduAdv1 -0.0055282 -0.002057 0.0103590 -0.028855 0.013251
EduAdv2 -0.0390619** -0.001335 0.0193690 -0.079462 -0.003554
EduAdv3 -0.0771914** -0.002887 0.0368808 -0.152094 -0.006279
Indirect Effects on Econ2 Through Income
BigFiveO 0.0007967 0.000013 0.0006017 -0.000079 0.002374
BigFiveC -0.0012595** -0.000023 0.0008582 -0.003481 -0.000027
BigFiveE -0.0006509 0.000015 0.0005691 -0.002069 0.000266
BigFiveA 0.0014288** -0.000012 0.0008323 0.000170 0.003445
BigFiveN 0.0016263** 0.000038 0.0009027 0.000386 0.004007
IQ -0.0026534** -0.000029 0.0014067 -0.006294 -0.000620
EduBasic 0.0363183** -0.000210 0.0154145 0.011936 0.072278
EduHS 0.0172531 -0.000432 0.0193035 -0.014470 0.064562
EduAdv1 -0.0036158 0.000075 0.0115077 -0.029933 0.018067
EduAdv2 -0.0446664** -0.000797 0.0175279 -0.084117 -0.015628
EduAdv3 -0.0895908** -0.0008345 0.0333517 -0.016098 -0.028766
Note: Controls Included, Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals, EduVoc ommitted. **Sig. at 5% level
established through Confidence Interval Estimation
We report estimated sizes of the indirect effects of a standard deviation change in person-
ality traits and IQ on our ideological measures through income in Table 7 below. For our
educational measures the size of the effects of a one-unit change in these dummy variables are
straightforwardly seen from the estimated coefficients in Tables 6a,b.
32
Table 7: Estimated Indirect Effects on Leftwing Preferences
Ideological Measure in Equation 2
One Standard Deviation Change In: Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
BigFiveO -0.01 0.01 0.004 0.005
BigFiveC -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
BigFiveE -0.01 -0.01 -0.003 -0.004
BigFiveA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BigFiveN 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
IQ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Note: Recall Party measured on a 1-9 scale, others on a 1-10 scale.
We expect to find that the indirect effects of personality traits through income will be in
the same direction as the direct effects. Indeed, we find that when the indirect effects are
significant, the signs of the estimated indirect effects are the same as the signs of the estimated
direct effects for our personality trait measures. Emotional Stability has a significant indirect
negative effect (lower values of BigFiveN ) for all four of our ideological measures. Thus,
the indirect effect of Emotional Stability on ideological preferences is to lead individuals to
express more rightwing preferences, as we also find in the direct effect of this trait on ideology.
Agreeableness has a significant positive indirect effect on Leftist and Econ2. Again, individuals
who are more agreeable are more likely to be leftist through both the indirect and the direct
effect. Conscientiousness has a significant negative indirect effect on our two economic measures
of ideology, Econ1 and Econ2. Hence, conscientious individuals are more likely to express
rightwing preferences on economic policies both through the direct effect of this trait on these
preferences and the indirect effect through income of this trait on such preferences. Extraversion
and Openness have no significant indirect effects which is not surprisingly since they have no
significant effects on income levels. However, all of these indirect effects are small, averaging
a change of 0.01 in a scale that has a maximum of either 9 or 10, and thus only leading to at
most an almost negligible effect on ideological preferences.
With respect to Intelligence and Educational Attainment, we also find significant indirect
effects in the predicted directions. In particular, we expect to find that Intelligence increases
Income and thus leads to more rightwing ideological positions, which is strongly supported.
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However, as with personality traits, the indirect effect is small, only about 0.01. We find that
individuals with lower levels of Educational Attainment are significantly more likely to express
leftist positions as compared to individuals with more advanced education. Specifically, we
find that the effect on ideology of educational differences through effects on income on those
whose educational attainment is Basic or High School only is significantly positive for all our
ideology measures, such that lower educational attainment does appear to reduce income leading
to more leftist positions. Furthermore, we find that for those with advanced academic education
beyond level 1, the effect on ideology of educational difference through the effects on income is
significantly negative for all four measures of ideology, such that higher educational attainment
definitely increases income leading to more rightwing preferences. These indirect effect sizes
are somewhat larger than the indirect effect sizes of a standard deviation change in personality
traits or IQ, for example, individuals with the highest advanced education have an indirect effect
size of about 0.16 for our general ideological measures.
Direct and Indirect Effects Compared
The evidence then is fairly robust that income serves as a mediating or suppressing variable for
the effects of personality traits, intelligence, and education on ideological preferences, generally
as predicted. Given that these indirect effects may amplify or reduce direct effects, it is useful
to compare the direct and indirect effects. Such a comparison is provided in Figures 1a,b,c,
and d below for the ideological measures Party, Liberalism, Econ1, and Econ2, respectively,
for the individual characteristics which have significant direct or indirect effects (or both) on
our ideological measures. If an effect is insignificant, it is given a 0 value.24 The columns
present the proportion of the total effect of each characteristic that is direct and indirect. The
portions of the columns that are positive are effects that increase the likelihood of expressing
leftist preferences, the portions of the columns that are negative are effects that increase the
likelihood of expressing rightwing preferences. The total effects are represented by the sum of
24See Shrout and Bolger (2002) for a discussion of a similar measure and justification for assigning a 0 to
nonsignificant effects.
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the two portions, which always equal 100%. So for example, in Figure 1a which shows the
direct and indirect effects of EduAdv3 on Party, we see that the direct effect of post graduate
education is positive and leads to an increase in leftist, while the indirect effect of post graduate
education through income is negative and leads to a decrease in leftist. The direct effect is 80%
of the total effect, while the indirect effect is 20% of the total effect, so the total effect is positive.
Figure 1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Personality Traits, IQ, and Educational
Attainment on ideology (Educational Baseline is Vocational Education)
Figure 1a: Effects on Party
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Figure 1b: Effects on Liberalism
Figure 1c: Effects on Econ1
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Figure 1d: Effects on Econ2
As Figures 1a-d demonstrate, across ideological measures the indirect effects of personality
traits through income reinforce the direct effects and are much smaller in comparison to the
direct effects. Thus, the main effects of personality traits on ideological preferences are direct
ones. For intelligence and basic educational attainment, since the direct effect is not significantly
different from zero, the indirect effect is equivalent to the total effect. For intelligence the indirect
effect is negative, leading to lower levels of leftist, while for basic educational attainment, the
indirect effect is positive, leading to higher levels of leftist.
The indirect effects on our ideological measures for advanced education of a bachelor’s degree
and beyond are always in the opposite direct of the direct effects, which are also significant.
Recall that the comparison is to vocational educational attainment. For the economic measures
of ideology, Econ1 and Econ2, these indirect effects strongly outweigh the direct effects of such
educational attainment for individuals with post-graduate education, leading these individuals
to be more rightwing than those with vocational education only in their responses to ideological
questions about economic policy.
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6 Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates that income serves to varying degrees as a mediating or suppressing
variable between the effects of personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educational attainment
and their effects on ideological preferences. We make the following discoveries:
First, we find that personality traits have significant, albeit small, indirect effects on ideo-
logical preferences through their effects on income. Specifically, we find that individuals who
have higher levels of Emotional Stability are more likely to make higher incomes which indirectly
leads these individuals to express more rightwing preferences. We find weaker evidence that
Agreeableness has an indirect effect through income on ideological preferences; as expected in-
dividuals who are more agreeable make lower incomes and this indirectly leads them to express
more leftist preferences. And we find that Conscientiousness has an indirect effect through
income on our economic policy measures of ideology; individuals who are more conscientious
make higher incomes which leads them to express more rightwing views on economic policies.
However, these effects are small relative to the direct effects of these variables on ideological
preferences and in the same direction. These results are largely consistent with theoretical
expectations and previous empirical research.
Second, we find that intelligence has a significant negative indirect effect on ideological
preferences through its effect on income. Controlling for income the direct effect of intelligence
on ideological preferences is not significant, so the indirect effect is equivalent to the total effect
and thus we find that increasing intelligence increases rightist preferences. This result is contrary
to theoretical expectations and previous empirical research. However, the size of the effect is
small relative to the direct effects of personality traits on ideology and the direct and indirect
effects of educational attainment on ideology.
Third, we find that achievement of advanced education also has significant negative indirect
effects on ideological preferences through their effects on income. These effects are large in
comparison to the direct effects and in the opposite direction. This result is consistent with
38
theoretical expectations and previous empirical research.
Our analysis provides new insights into how personality traits, cognitive abilities, and educa-
tional attainment affect ideology. In particular, our analysis shows that studies measuring the
effects of these individualized characteristics on ideology should take into consideration the role
played by income as a mediating or suppressing variable, otherwise the size (and with respect to
intelligence, the direction) of these effects may be incorrectly estimated. Our results showing
that intelligence through its effect on income can indirectly lead to more rightist preferences
calls into question previous theoretical and empirical work that intelligence leads to more leftist
ideological preferences. And our research on the indirect effects of variation in educational
attainment on ideology through income demonstrates that treating education and income as
separate independent variables in analyses of ideological preferences can lead to problematic
conclusions.
Finally, our analysis of the effects of the personality traits of Openness, Conscientiousness,
and Emotional Stability also show that the previous work on the relationship between personality
and ideology has external validity–is robust to consideration by different subject pools and to
strong verified income data. Our results on Agreeableness support the contention of Gerber
et al. (2010) that contextual differences may complicate the relationship between personality
traits and ideological preferences.
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7 Appendix: Data Summary & Comparison to Danish Popu-
lation
In Table A1 we present a summary of the variables used in the analysis. Note that since all
subjects did not answer all of the ideology questions, we have different numbers of observations
for each ideology question estimation. Thus, we present the means and standard deviations for
the variables used in each estimation separately, by ideological question. As the data shows,
there is little variation across estimations in these variables.
Table A1: Variables Used in Analysis
Party Question Leftist Question Econ1 Question Econ2 Question
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 47.04 13.98 47.25 13.91 47.05 13.89 47.07 13.89
Female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
Urban 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Church 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.35
Married 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48
Couple 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
Divorced 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28
EduBasic 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
EduHS 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23
EduAdv1 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
EduAdv2 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
EduAdv3 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Student 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Parttime 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
Retired 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Unemployed 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28
Income 12.47 0.76 12.48 0.75 12.47 0.75 12.47 0.75
BigFiveA 32.40 5.56 32.41 5.54 32.43 5.53 32.43 5.52
BigFiveC 33.00 5.63 33.01 5.57 33.00 5.56 33.00 5.56
BigFiveE 30.61 6.36 30.53 6.35 30.52 6.34 30.51 6.35
BigFiveN 19.01 7.04 19.00 7.01 19.07 7.02 19.07 7.03
BigFiveO 27.24 6.16 27.28 6.12 27.17 6.14 27.16 6.14
IQ 8.85 2.88 8.86 2.88 8.86 2.89 8.86 2.89
Party 5.06 2.57
Leftist 5.59 2.21
Econ1 5.17 2.26
Econ2 4.08 1.98
Observations 1893 2028 2107 2106
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Table A2 below compares our subjects to the Danish population 18 years old and older.
Again, we present separate comparisons for the set of subjects who answered each of the four
ideological questions. Note that the Danish census numbers are measured for those who have
completed a given educational level and thus we report from our survey the comparison numbers,
which are slightly different from those used in the analysis which classifies individuals in an
educational category if they have completing or are in the process of completing a particular
level. Unfortunately we do not have comparison numbers from the Danish population for
our personality trait measures and IQ. In fact, the Danish Psychological Publishing Company
agreed partly to allow us to use their measures in order to provide them with better population
estimates of these traits.
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Table A2: Comparison to Danish Population
Danish Ideological Measure
Characteristic Population Party Leftist Econ1 Econ2
Gender
Women 50.2% 48.0% 47.6% 48.8% 48.8%
Age
18-30 20.2% 14.3% 13.5% 13.3% 13.9%
31-40 19.0% 17.3% 16.8% 16.8% 17.5%
41-50 19.6% 26.9% 25.5% 25.5% 27.5%
51-60 17.8% 23.2% 23.6% 23.6% 23.2%
61-70 15.0% 14.1% 15.0% 15.1% 13.8%
71-80 8.4% 4.1% 5.7% 5.7% 4.1%
Education
Basic (up to 10 years) 26.3% 11.8% 11.4% 11.3% 11.4%
High School (up to 12 years) 6.4% 5.7% 5.7% 5.5% 5.5%
Vocational (up to 12 years) 39.1% 34.2% 34.0% 34.9% 34.9%
Short Tertiary (less than 3 years) 5.4% 6.7% 7.0% 6.8% 7.0%
Medium Tertiary (between 3 & 4 years) 15.7% 27.0% 27.3% 27.0% 26.8%
Long Tertiary (more than 4 years) 7.2% 14.5% 14.7% 14.5% 14.4%
Income (DKK per year)
less than 100,000 13.7% 8.8% 8.7% 8.7% 8.8%
100,000-199,999 26.2% 16.7% 16.4% 16.8% 16.7%
200,000-299,999 23.2% 24.9% 25.1% 25.5% 25.4%
300,000-399,999 20.0% 26.2% 26.3% 26.3% 26.4%
more than 400,000 16.9% 23.3% 23.5% 22.7% 22.7%
Church Membership
Member of the state church 82.7% 85.8% 85.7% 86.0% 86.0%
Note: Gender and Age is based on individuals aged 18-80. Education is based on individuals aged 18-69.
The education variables for the survey include ongoing education, but these figures are for completed
education only. Church members is based on individuals aged 20-79.
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